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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") is one
of the few agencies of the federal government that makes a profit-it
earns more in user fees than it spends on operations, thus generating a
surplus.'
One of the user fees contributing to this surplus is the so-called

Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
Princeton University, BS cum laude; Harvard Law School, JD. Professor, University of
Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank my research assistant, Joseph McCully (UB '17).
1 See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2017: THE USPTO
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, (2016) [hereinafter USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION]. Another profitable agency is the Export-Import Bank. See Christopher
Matthews, The FederalAgency That Makes $1 Billionfor Taxpayers and the Fight to Abolish It,
TIME (Oct. 24, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/24/the-federal-agency-that-makes-lbillion-for-taxpayers-and-the-fight-to-abolish-it.

427

428

CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

[Vol. 36:2

"petition for extension of time" fee. 2 It is, in effect, a late fee. 3 The
patent statute gives applicants six months to respond to correspondence
from the USPTO, but also gives the Commissioner authority to set a
shorter period for response. 4 The Commissioner has done so, pursuant
to this statutory authority.5 The Commissioner has, however, provided
that if an applicant misses the shorter deadline set by the USPTO, the
applicant may file a petition for an "extension of time," which extends
the time for response in one month increments, up to the statutory six
month deadline. 6 The statute provides for fees for such extensions;7 the
USPTO has set fees for such extensions which are greater than those set
forth in the statute.8
The USPTO may argue that the difference is explained by the fact
that, in addition to the "extension fee" set by the statute, there is also a
petition required, and this explains the additional fee. However, the
petition is always granted if the applicant does two things: (i) submits
the petition (which does no more than identify the application and
indicate how payment is being made); and (ii) pays a fee. 9 There is no
substantive inquiry into why an applicant has missed the shortened
deadline or what impact the delay has had. The procedure amounts to
submitting a document which does little more than answer the question:
"have you enclosed your check?"
Thus, what might appear superficially to be an effort to improve
the flow or quality of the agency's work and a fee for processing a
petition, is arguably, in fact, nothing more than a revenue generatorbringing in nearly $150 million a year.10
This Article explores the question of whether patent applicants
should applaud the ingenuity of the system as a creative use of financial
incentives to expedite and improve the process of obtaining a patent, or
criticize it as a thinly disguised misuse of congressional authority solely
to generate revenue.II
Part I provides an overview of the patent application process and
explains how timing requirements create the opportunity to charge

2 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17, 1.136 (2018).
3 See discussion infra Part IB.
4 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).
5 MPEP § 710.02(b) (9th ed. Oct. 2015) ("Under the authority given him or her by 35 U.S.C. §
133, the Director of the USPTO has directed the examiner to set a shortened period for reply to
every action. The length of the shortened statutory period to be used depends on the type of reply
required. Some specific cases of shortened statutory periods for reply are given below. These
periods may be changed under special, rarely occurring circumstances.").
6 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1) (2018).
7 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(8) (2012).
8 37 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2018).
9 Id
10 See USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 1, at app. VI
11 See discussion infra Parts I-1V.
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"extension of time" fees.1 2 Part II describes the relevant statutory
provisions and how the patent office has interpreted them to create a
revenue source.' 3 Part III explores possible justifications for the
system.1 4 Part IV introduces the constraints placed on the patent office
under the Administrative Procedure Act and how the Act bears on the
validity of the system, concluding that the current system does not
satisfy the APA requirements of public notice and comment.15 Part V
explores possible options: whether the USPTO can adopt a valid late fee
system, whether inventors have any recourse under the current system,
and whether there are other ways to accomplish the goal of improving
the quality of the patent prosecution process.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Prosecutionand the Role of Timing
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution establishes the goal of the
U.S. Patent system: scientific progress.' 7 The Constitution also provides
Congress with a tool for accomplishing that goal: the power to grant
limited term monopolies.18 Congress established an agency, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, charged with evaluating which
contributions to scientific progress are worthy of the grant of the
monopoly and the standards by which that determination is to be
made.1 9 Congress adopted a system which attempts "to reconcile this
12 See notes and accompany discussion, supra Part I.
13 See infra Part II.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part V.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
18 Id.
19 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012). The first patent statute provided for issuance of patents by a board
composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General if the board
considered "the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important." Patent Act of 1790, ch.
7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). The second patent statute provided for the
issuance of patents upon petition to the Secretary of State, without examination. Patent Act of
1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318 (1793) (repealed 1836). In 1802, a separate position was
created within the Secretary of State's office, designated the Superintendent of Patents. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE STORY OF THE U.S. PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 3 (1981); THE U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & REC. ADMIN., RECORDS OF
THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (2016), https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fedrecords/groups/241.html. The Patent Act of 1836 reintroduced an examination system, in
response to abuses that predictably resulted from a system in which patents were issued in
response to ex parte assertions that the applicant had created an invention. Patent Act of 1836, ch.
357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (current version at 52 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012)). The legislative history of
the 1836 Act explained the need for an organization charged with examining applications for
patents, noting that the earlier statute had produced patents which were ultimately determined to
be "worthless and void, as conflicting with, and infringing upon one another, or upon, public
rights not subject to patent privileges; arising either from a want of due attention to the
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Nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to
encourage progress" 20 by motivating innovators to disclose trade secrets
in exchange for limited-term protection against the manufacture, use,
sale, or importation of products incorporating the protected
technology. 2 1 The statute gives the Director of the USPTO the power to
adopt regulations governing procedures before the agency.22 These
regulations are contained in volume 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations ("CFR"). Specific internal rules governing the examination
of patent applications are contained in the USPTO's Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure ("MPEP").23
The process of obtaining a patent is initiated by filing a written
application with the USPTO. 24 The application is reviewed by a patent
examiner who determines whether the claimed invention meets the
requirements of the patent statute. 25 The examiner's conclusion and
specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the patentees of the state of the arts" and "a great
number of lawsuits ... onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society." S.
REP. No. 24-239, at 3-4 (1836). In 1849, the Patent Office was moved from the Department of
State to the Department of the Interior, and in 1925 it was moved to its current organizational
location within the Department of Commerce.
20 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966).
21 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012) (giving a patent owner the right to prevent competitors from
making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention for a period starting on the date the
USPTO issues the patent and ending twenty years after the effective date of the application.).
Some patent terms are subject to adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in
processing by the Patent Office. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2012). See also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (infringing these rights creates liability for
damages that are to be no less than "a reasonable royalty"); 35 U.S.C. § 283, 285 (2012)
(enabling courts to enjoin infringements in accordance with general equitable principles and
authorizing the award of attorney fees in certain cases). For a more detailed analysis of the
economic rationale for the patent system, see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable
Subject Matter and SeparationofPowers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2012).
22 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012) (giving the USPTO authority to establish regulations, "not
inconsistent with law" governing proceedings before the agency). The Federal Circuit has held
that this does not amount to a grant of authority to make substantive (as opposed to procedural)
rules. See Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)
("To comply with section 2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must be 'procedural'-i.e., it must
'govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office."'); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
23 See, e.g., MPEP § 710.02 (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
24 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012); see also 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (providing for the filing of
"provisional" applications which are essentially options to proceed with non-provisional
Applications. Provisional applications are not examined for patentability.).
25 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) ("The Director shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant
is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent therefor."); 37 C.F.R. §
1. 104(a)(1) (2018) ("On taking up an application ...
the examiner shall make a thorough study
thereof and shall make a thorough investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject
matter of the claimed invention. The examination shall be complete with respect both to
compliance of the application . .. with the applicable statutes and rules and to the patentability of
the invention as claimed."); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974)
("[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls
within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101."); 35 U.S.C.
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reasoning are reported to the applicant in a written document known as
an office action. 26 The applicant is given at least one opportunity to
respond and attempt to convince the examiner that the application
discloses a patentable invention. 27 The statute requires that the applicant
respond within six months. 28
If the applicant and examiner reach an agreement on the scope of
patentable claims, a patent is issued that gives the owner the right to
stop others from making, using, selling (or offering for sale), or
importing products incorporating the patented claims for a period of
twenty years from the date the application was originally filed. 29 If they
fail to reach an agreement, the application is denied and the applicant
has the option to appeal to the Patent Trials and Appeals Board
(USPTO's internal appeals board) or to sue the USPTO in federal
district court. 30 If the applicant does not respond to the USPTO action
within six months, the application is deemed abandoned.3 1 If the
USPTO sets a shortened statutory period for response (which it always
does), the applicant responds within six months but after the shortened
statutory period, and the applicant does not submit a petition for
extension and fee, the application is also deemed abandoned. 32

§ 101 (2012)(stating that the claimed invention must fall within one of the four categories of
"statutory subject matter" listed in the statute); 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("useful" requirement); see
MPEP § 2107 (9th ed. Nov. 2015)(interpreted by the PTO to mean that it has a "specific,
substantial and credible" use). The invention must also be noveland must not be considered
obvious by someone of ordinary skill in the art. See 35 U.S.C. § 101-03 (2012). Finally, the
invention must be sufficiently described and illustrated so that those of ordinary skill in the art
can make and use the inventionand distinctly claimed so as to give the public notice of the scope
of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 112-13 (2012). In addition, the format of the claims must comply with
internal rules that require that it be a single sentence and meet with other stylistic requirements.
See MPEP § 608.01 (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
26 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(2) (2018).
27 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (2018) (detailing that the type of response depends on the nature of the
examiner's position. In overview, the applicant can either attempt to convince the examiner that
the claimed invention is, in fact, patentable or can redefine the claimed invention to address the
examiner's reasons for rejecting the claims by amending the application.).
28 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2012). The current statute also gives the Director of the USPTO the power to
shorten the time limit to no less than thirty days. Earlier statutes did not set a time limit for
response. See infra note 38.
29 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.314 (2018) (instructing that under certain
circumstances, the term of the patent may be lengthened, typically when there has been undue
delay by the USPTO in processing the application, or shortened ,typically when there are earlier,
related patent applications). These special situations do not affect the analysis of the extension
fees. The critical factor in computing the patent term is that it is tied to the date on which the
application was filed and that any delay introduced into the application process by the applicant
cannot extend the patent term. Id.
30 35 U.S.C. §§ 134, 145 (2012).
31 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).
32 See id.; 37 C.F.R. § 1.134 (2018); MPEP § 710.02(b) (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
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B. The "ShortenedStatutory Period"and Extension Fees
Unlike most government operations, the USPTO makes a profit. 3 3
In 2015 (the last year for which such data are available), the USPTO
charged slightly in excess of $3 billion in fees, of which roughly $2.75
billion were attributable to patent fees. 34
One of the fees contributing to this surplus (accounting for $151
million35 in 2015) is the so-called "petition for extension of time" fee. 3 6
It is, in effect, a late fee created by a mix of statutory and regulatory
command.
Once the patent examiner assigned to the case has reviewed it for
patentability, the USPTO communicates the results of that review in
what is referred to as an "Office action." 37 The patent statute gives
applicants six months to respond to correspondence from the USPTO,
but also gives the Director of the USPTO authority to set a shorter
period for response. 38 The director has exercised this power: 39 in fact,
the Director has "directed the examiner to set a shortened period for
reply to every action." 4 0 In other words, an applicant is never given the
full six months Congress established in the statute. In the most common
situation, responding to an action by the USPTO on the merits of the
application, the Director gives the patent applicant three months to
reply, 41 rather than the six months established by Congress. 42
The Director has, however, also provided that if an applicant
33 See USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION supra note 1.

34 See id. at app. V.
35 Id. at app. Vt.
36 37 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2018).
37 37 C.F.R. 1.104(a)(2) (2018) ("The applicant ... will be notified of the examiner's action. The
reasons for any adverse action or any objection or requirement will be stated in an Office action
and such information or references will be given as may be useful in aiding the applicant . . . to
judge the propriety of continuing the prosecution.").
38 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2012) ("Upon failure of the applicant to prosecute the application within six
months after any action therein, of which notice has been given or mailed to the applicant, or
within such shorter time, not less than thirty days, as fixed by the Director in such action, the
application shall be regarded as abandoned by the parties thereto."). The 1836 patent statute (the
first to provide for examination of applications by a patent office) did not set any time limit for
responding to patent office correspondence. The statute was amended to require an applicant to
respond within a year, then amended again to shorten the time for response to six months. Finally,
in 1939, the statute was again amended to give the Commissioner the power to set a shorter time
limit for response. HR 6878 (1939)(amending what was then 35 U.S.C. § 37.).
39 37 C.F.R. § 1.134 (2018)(setting forth the general rule established by the Director: "[a]n Office
action will notify the applicant of any non-statutory or shortened statutory time period set for
reply to an Office action. Unless the applicant is notified in writing that a reply is required in less
than six months, a maximum period of six months is allowed.").
40 MPEP § 710.02(b) (9th ed. Nov. 2015) ("Under the authority given him or her by 35 U.S.C. §
133, the Director of the USPTO has directed the examiner to set a shortened period for reply to
every action. The length of the shortened statutory period to be used depends on the type of reply
required. Some specific cases of shortened statutory periods for reply are given below. These
periods may be changed under special, rarely occurring circumstances.").
41 Id.

42 35 U.S.C.

§

133 (2012).
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misses the shortened period, the applicant may file a "petition for
extension of time" requesting an extension of time to file a response at
any time up to the six-month statutory deadline. 43 The petition is both
straightforward and non-substantive.
To obtain an extension of time, an applicant must merely file a
"petition for an extension of time" and pay the appropriate fee." A
review of the required contents of a petition for extension of time
reveals its true nature. The USPTO provides an online form which
satisfies the requirements of the petition.4 5 The form contains six blanks
that must be filled in by the applicant and a series of check boxes. The
blanks require that the applicant:
identify the docket number (which is optional);
identify the USPTO-assigned application number;
state the filing date of the application;
state the title of the application;
identify which art unit the application has been assigned to;
and
identify the USPTO examiner in charge of reviewing the
application. 46
The check boxes ask the applicant to:
state how long an extension is being requested;
state whether special status (which would entitle the applicant
to reduced fees because of the annual income of the applicant,
not the nature of the invention or the nature of the delay giving
rise to the need for an extension) is being claimed; 47 and
state how payment is being made (check, credit card, USPTO
charge account or EFS-Web payment) 48
Having completed the above steps, the person requesting the

43 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1) (2018) (providing "[i]f an applicant is required to reply within a
nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up
to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time
period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed.").
44 Id.; see also MPEP § 710.02(e) (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
45 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME UNDER 37 C.F.R.
1.136(A), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/forms/aiaOO22.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
46

d

47 Certain applicants are entitled to fee reductions based on income and the number of
applications previously filed. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.27, 1.28 (2018).
4 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME UNDER 37 C.F.R.

1.136(A), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/forms/aia0022.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
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extension must sign and date the form, and indicate whether they are the
applicant or a representative of the applicant.
The granting of the petition is automatic. 49 There is no substantive
inquiry into why the applicant missed the shortened deadline or
evaluation of the impact of the delay. The only inquiry is "have you
enclosed a check in the correct amount?" and a petition for extension of
time is always granted if the applicant pays the "extension of time
petition" fee.
The patent statute sets fees for extensions of time. 50 Under the
statute, the maximum fee for extension of time is $2350.51 The America
Invents Act ("AIA") gave the Director of the USPTO the power to
adjust fees for "services performed" in an amount sufficient to recover
costS. 52 Pursuant to this power, the USPTO raised the congressionallymandated fees: the USPTO's current fee schedule established extension
fees ranging from $200 for the first month to $3000 for a five-month
extension. 53
Even with these higher fees, extensions appear to be in great
demand-in 2014, the USPTO earned $151 million in extension of time
fees 5 4 and nearly $145 million in 2015.5s Increasing the cost of
obtaining a patent without any offsetting benefit to the applicant or the
public seems at odds with the constitutional objective of furthering
progress.
It is fair to ask, then, whether the petition requirement (and
associated fee system) is an effort to improve the patent prosecution
process or simply a revenue generator. The question is fairly directed to
Congress as to the concept of "late fees" in general, but it is also fairly
49 MPEP § 710.02(e) (9th ed. Nov. 2015)(emphasis added)("The filing of the petition and fee will
extend the time period to take action . . . . [T]he extension will be effective upon filing of the
petition and payment of the appropriate fee and without acknowledgment or action by the
Office.").
50 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(8)(A)-(C) (2012) ("For petitions for 1-month extensions of time to take
actions required by the Director in an application ... on filing a first petition, $130; . . . on filing
a second petition, $360; and. . . on filing a third or subsequent petition, $620.").
51 Id. The shortest period for response is one month; therefore, the longest available extension is
five months, resulting in a maximum extension fee of $2350 under the statutory fee schedule.
52 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 10(a)(1)-(2), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011)(codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012)) ("The Director may set or adjust by rule any fee established,
authorized, or charged under title 35, United States Code ...
for any services performed by or
materials furnished by, the Office, subject to paragraph (2).. .. Fees may be set or adjusted under
paragraph (1) only to recover the aggregate estimated costs to the Office for processing, activities,
services, and materials relating to patents (in the case of patent fees) ... including administrative
costs of the Office with respect to such patent ... fees.").
53 The USPTO's current fee schedule established the cost of extensions as: Extensions for
Response within 1st Month ($200); Extensions for Response within 2nd Month ($600);
Extensions for Response within 3rd Month ($1,400); Extensions for Response within 4th Month
($2,200) and Extensions for Response within 5th Month ($3,000). Setting and Adjusting Patent
Fees, 78 Fed. Reg. 4212 (Jan. 18, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1, 41, 42).
54 See USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 1, at app. V.
55 Id. at app. VI.
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directed to the USPTO with respect to the rationale (and authority) for
shortening the statutorily-allowed response time across the board and
for increasing the fees for extending the time back to the statutory time
limits above the amounts set by Congress.
II. LATE FEES: AUTHORITY AND ITS EXERCISE
As previously stated, the patent statute gives applicants six months
to respond to actions of the USPTO.5 6 It also gives the USPTO the
authority to reduce that time limit by setting a "shortened statutory
period" for response. 57 The USPTO has exercised that authority and
established shortened periods for response to every action by the
USPTO.58
The patent statute also authorizes the USPTO to charge fees for
extensions of time and sets specific amounts that are a function of the
length of the extension and the status of the applicant. 59 It also
authorizes the USPTO to adjust certain fees: the AIA authorizes the
USPTO Director to adjust fees "for any services performed by or
materials furnished by, the Office." 60
Thus the USPTO's authority is established-and limited-by the
combination of three statutory grants of authority: (i) the authority to set
extension of time fees; 61 (ii) the authority to set periods for response to
USPTO actions that are shorter than the six months provided by
statute 62, thereby making it more likely that an extension of time will be
required; and (iii) the authority to adjust the congressionally-set fees for
USPTO services, 63 thereby increasing the cost of obtaining an extension
of time.
The fit between these statutory sections is not perfect. While
formally called a "petition fee" (suggesting that some service is being
rendered in evaluating the petition), unlike other petitions handled by
the USPTO, the petition for extension of time is not substantive and no
judgment or effort is required on the part of the USPTO to process the
petition.64 Thus, the fee for the petition for extension of time is unlike
all of the other fees charged by the USPTO. Other fees are payments for
56

35 U.S.C.

§

133 (2012).

57 Id.

58

37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (2018); MPEP § 710.02(e) (9th ed. Nov. 2015).
59 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) Longer extensions are progressively more expensive. Discounts are
provided for applicants that are "small entities;" greater discounts are provided for applicants that
are "micro entities" both of which categories are defined in the statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 632
(2012) (defining small businesses); 35 U.S.C. § 123(a) (defining micro entities).
60 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 10(a)(1)-(2), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011)(codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
61 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
62 35 U.S.C. § 133 (2012).
63 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 10.
64
See id.
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identifiable services: for example, fees for filing documents, 65 fees for
conducting a patentability search, 66 fees for filing an appeal, 67 fees for
processing petitions requiring substantive examination, 68 and fees for
issuing an allowed patent. 69 Other fees even include some fees for late
action and involve actual services (in addition to accepting the petition
and confirming payment of the fee). 70 In the case of an extension of
time, it is not clear what service the USPTO is providing. The USPTO
must conduct the same review of a response to an office action whether
that response is filed one day after the action is communicated to the
applicant, three months after the action is communicated, or six months
after the action is communicated. If the "late fee" petition (which is not
substantively reviewed, and is simply a request to accept a filing made
within the time authorized by Congress, but after the shortened period
set by the USPTO) cannot be characterized as involving a "service,"
then it is not authorized by AIA § 10, and therefore the USPTO must
find another justification. 71
III. INGENIOUS MOTIVATIONAL TOOL OR VENAL
OPPORTUNISM?
Several possible motivations suggest themselves. It is possible to
imagine a theory under which something like a service is being
rendered. 72 It is also possible to imagine an argument that the late fee
provides an incentive for applicants to move patent applications along
quickly and this furthers a national policy. 73 Both theories are seriously
flawed. And in any event, the responsibility to provide justification for
the fees belongs, in the first instance, to the USPTO.
One justification, of course, is apparent from the second part of the
administrative rule: the applicant may take the full statutory six months
by submitting a non-substantive petition and paying a fee- the USPTO

65 Examples of such fees are the fee for filing a patent application and the fee for filing a
document (for example, an assignment of ownership). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2018); see also 37
C.F.R. § 1.19(b)(4) (2018).
66 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k) (2018).
67 37 C.F.R. § 41.20(b)(1) (2018).
68 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(g) (2018).
69 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a)(1) (2018).
70 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16 (2018). An example of a late fee justified by services rendered would be
the surcharge for late filing of required components of an application. In that case, the USPTO
must do extra work-it must retrieve an already-filed application, match it to the newly-filed
components and update the records.
71 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 10(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (201 1)(codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. §41 (2012)).
72 See sources cited infra note 77. The USPTO could certainly argue that it must process the
petition. It is difficult, however, to imagine that the cost of placing the petition in the file without
substantive consideration remotely approaches the fees charged. See MPEP § 710.02(e) (9th ed.
Nov. 2015); see also 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(8)(A)-(C) (2012).
73 See sources cited infra note 77.
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wants the money. Is the desire to earn more money a sufficient reason
for adopting a regulation, especially for an agency which is taking in
more in fees than necessary to operate?
Generally, agency fees are to be set to cover costs and not to
further policy goals, 74 and judging by the revenue still being generated
by extension fees, it does not seem to be achieving any goal other than
generating revenue. Assuming that the average extension fee paid is
simply the average of the lowest fee ($65) and the highest fee ($3,000),
and then dividing that into the most recent available revenue from
extension fees ($151,000,000)75 suggests that there are roughly 100,000
requests for extension per year-a significant fraction of the total
number of pending applications.
A second justification is suggested, however indirectly, by the case
of In re Lemelson.76 The Lemelson Court noted that Congress had
reduced the response time from one year to six months and had given
the USPTO the authority to reduce it further in response to a strategy of
"submarine patents" (patents resulting from applications where the
applicant had deliberately delayed issue in order to extend the term and
to trap competitors who spent money not knowing that their actions
might conceivably infringe an as-yet unissued patent). 77
If that is the justification, though, it will prove insufficient because
of two statutory changes which took place after Lemelson was decided.
First, while patent applications were maintained in confidence until
issued at the time Lemelson was decided (and at the time the petition for
extension fees were introduced), 78 they are now published eighteen
months after filing. 79 Thus, in most cases (an exception is U.S. only
applications if the applicant files a petition to prevent publication)
competitors will not be kept in the dark for long. At most, no longer
than the normal pendency period of a US patent application. Second, at
the time Lemelson was decided, applicants had an incentive in some

74 Seafarers Int'l Union of North America v. U.S. Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179, 183 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("[Plolicy decisions, whereby an agency could, for example, adjust assessments to
encourage or discourage a particular activity, would . .. infringe on Congress's exclusive power
to levy taxes")(citing Nat'1 Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S., 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974)).
75 See USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 1, at app. VI.

76 In re Lemelson, 902 F.2d 44 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
77 Steve Blount, The Use ofDelaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a
Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11, 13
(1999). Lemelson was apparently a master of the strategy: "More than five million United States
patents have issued from 1914 through 2001. Lemelson's own exhibits demonstrate that ...
Lemelson holds the top thirteen positions for the longest prosecutions. Some of the claims
asserted by Lemelson in this case will not expire until 2011, fifty-five years after the 1956
application was filed and forty-eight years after the application issued as a patent." Symbol
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., L.P., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156 (D.
Nev. 2004).
78 47 Fed. Reg. 41273 (September 17, 1982).
79 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
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cases to delay processing. Patents lasted for seventeen years from date
of issue. Under subsequent changes in the patent statute, patents now
last for 20 years from date of application.8 0 Thus, any delay works
against the applicant and removes any incentive to pursue a "submarine
patent" strategy.
Therefore, the theory supported by Lemelson (if in fact that was
the USPTO's rationale) can no longer support the continued application
of late fees.
The USPTO has stated in support of the extension fee that it
"incentivizes an applicant to give more consideration to filing an
extension of time request, and thereby facilitates the prompt conclusion
of application processing, which assists in . . . [c]oncluding prosecution
more quickly" which means that "new ideas can go to market faster and
provide technological progress . . . ."s8 This explanation is puzzling
because it is not clear what an applicant who misses the shortened
statutory period for response will give "more consideration" to. Failing
to pay the fee means the application is abandoned (and may never go to
the market or provide technological progress). 82 The argument would
also appear to be undercut by the blanket nature of the rule. In addition,
it would seem that getting the maximum term of patent protection
would be incentive enough for applicants to move as quickly as
possible, and the additional fee would provide little, if any, further
incentive. If the USPTO believes that farther incentive is required, it
would seem that a greater incentive would be provided by promising
that a prompt response by the applicant would result in a prompt
response by the USPTO. The USPTO already offers this type of
incentive in other contexts. 83
Finally, even if such a demonstration could be made, the USPTO
would also need to show that getting applicant responses in three
months rather than six somehow resulted in more efficient or faster
action by the USPTO. The latest available data shows that the USPTO
takes, on average, 17.3 months to generate its first substantive action on

80 Effective for applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the term of patents was changed from

17 years from date of issue (which would defer, but not reduce, the term of the patent and
therefore might encourage delaying prosecution) to 20 years from the date the earliest application
was filed (which would mean that any delay by the applicant would reduce the total term of the
patent). 35 U.S.C. § 154.
81 Regulatory Impact Analysis: Setting and Adjusting Patent Fees in Accordance with Section 10
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE (2013), at 111
[hereinafter Regulatory Impact Analysis].
82 Applicants still pay hundreds of thousands of extension fees annually. See infra note 75 and
related text.
83 The USPTO provides several options for expediting processing by either meeting certain
conditions, paying extra fees, or submitting applications in a form that makes evaluation easier.
37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2015).
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an application. 84 Since this period of delay relates to the initial action by
the USPTO, by definition the USPTO was not waiting for anything
from the applicant; it would seem, therefore, that the most significant
delays in processing patent applications are the result of understaffing
rather than anything an applicant does.
Administrative agencies are typically delegated authority to "fill
the gap[s]" left by Congressional grants of authority.85 In theory, the
authority is delegated to an agency which has greater expertise in the
field than does Congress. 86 Agencies typically adopt "interpretative
rules" designed "to advise the public of the agency's construction of the
statutes and rules which it administers." 87 Such rules may be adopted by
the agency without formal explanation or public input.8 8 An example
would be the USPTO's Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.89 It has
no force of law, 90 but provides guidance as to how the USPTO's
examiners should handle patent applications. When, however, an
agency adopts a regulation that affects substantive rights, it must
provide its rationale and allow the public to participate in the process of
adoption of the regulation. 91
IV. CONSTRAINTS: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The USPTO's regulatory scheme may be a good idea. It is,
however, the USPTO's duty to establish that this is so: the reason that
the USPTO adopted the system should be clear, 92 but is not. The failure
to comply with procedural requirements for its adoption is every bit as
important as the substantive rule. 93
84 Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2015, U.S.P.T.O. (2015), at 19
(indicating a first action pendency goal of 16.4 months and actual first action pendency of 17.3
months).
85 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
86 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
87 Tom C. Clark, Attorney General'sManual on the Administrative ProcedureAct, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE (1947), at 30 n.3.
88 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1966).
89 MPEP § 710.02(b).
90 Id. Interpretative rules may explain ambiguous language in statutes or remind parties of
existing duties. However, interpretative rules are not those that create new law. UPMC Mercy v.
Sebelius, 793 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 2011).
91 A principal purpose of the APA is to assure public participation in the rulemaking process. See
COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, MONOGRAPHS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. No. 76-186 (3d Sess. 1940); Erringer v. Thompson, 371
F.3d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 2004).
92 As discussed below, the USPTO's decision to implement the late fee system was a substantive
administrative action and therefore the USPTO was under a duty to propose the system formally
and to justify, on the record, the reasons for doing so. See infra Section VI(B).
93 "[A]gency discretion is limited not only by substantive, statutory grants of authority, but also
by the procedural requirements which 'assure fairness and mature consideration of rules of
general application."' Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 303 (1979). The "procedure must
be scrupulously observed." Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959)(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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Congress has also given the USPTO specific authority with respect
to establishing shortened deadlines. 94
The actual exercise of these powers, however, is rulemaking under
the APA 95 and therefore the regulations setting a "shortened statutory
period" for response and establishing the fees for "late" responses are
promulgations subject to the APA. 96

The most recent overhaul of the patent statute, the America Invents
Act, 97 specifically deals with the issue of fee-setting: it "allows the
USPTO to set or adjust all of its fees, including those related to patents
and trademarks, so long as they do no more than reasonably compensate
the USPTO for the services performed." 98 The authority conferred by
the AIA is not, however, unconstrained.
Although administrative agencies are created by Congress, they
are components of the executive branch of government with the power
to adopt rules. They therefore present an inherent issue for separation of
powers. The principal issues are whether the legislature can delegate
rule making authority to an executive branch agency, and whether the
judicial branch must defer to decisions made by agencies.
The Administrative Procedure Act is an attempt to create a
framework for the resolution of those issues. 99 It provides that in
considering administrative action, "the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions." The courts, however, have held that certain agency actions
are entitled to judicial deference.10 0

94 35 U.S.C § 133 (2013).
95 A "rule" is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect ... and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
... pnces ... services or ... costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing." 5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (2011). "[R]ule making" is defined as the "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule". 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2011). In this case, the action of setting a
shortened statutory period and charging a fee for taking the full statutory time allowed affects a
license as defined by the APA. "[L]icensing" is defined to include any "agency process respecting
the grant, renewal, denial . . . limitation, amendment, modification, or conditioning of a license" 5
U.S.C. § 515(9), while a "license" is defined to include "the whole or a part of an agency ...
approval". 5 U.S.C. § 515(8). Under this definition, issuing a patent would constitute granting a
license.
96 Setting the fee and requiring its payment as a condition for further processing of a patent
application falls within the APA's definition of "sanction", which "includes the whole or a part of
an agency- . .. (C) imposition of penalty or fine; (D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding
of property; ... [or] (G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action. 5 U.S.C. § 515(10).
97 Public Law 112-29, Sept. 16, 2011.
98 H.R. REP. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011).
99 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2000).
100 while these issues are currently resolved through the "Chevron" and "Auer" deference, there
are signs that concerns remain. Representative John Ratcliffe and Senator Orrin G. Hatch
introduced the Separation of Powers Restoration Act, S. 2724 and H.R. 4768, "grounded on the
basic principle that courts, not agencies, have the power to decide questions of law and to hold
agency officials accountable to the law. . . . The bill is remarkably straightforward: it merely
clarifies the APA to restore de novo judicial review of questions of law." Congress Must Act to
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A. Deference in Review of USPTO Regulations
The USPTO has, of course, only the power granted it by Congress.
Moreover, as an administrative agency, the USPTO is subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act. Among the USPTO's powers is a
general power to "establish regulations, not inconsistent with the law,
which ... shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office." 10 ' The
Federal Circuit has, however, held that this "does not vest the USPTO
with any general substantive rulemaking power"1 02-it only grants the
power to make procedural rules.
In reviewing administrative regulations, courts owe certain
deference under certain circumstances. 103 In the case of establishing late
fees, there are competing theories of whether courts should grant special
deference to the agency.
Scheduling matters are generally viewed as being "definitely at the
procedural end of a spectrum running from 'procedural' to
'substantive.'" 10 Viewed as an entirety, though, the extension of time
fee system does more than establish scheduling: it also imposes fees 10 5
and has the potential to deprive applicants of the right to proceed. 0 6
The basic principle governing judicial deference to administrative
action is referred to as "Chevron deference." 107 In summary, Chevron
establishes three broad principles:
1) "When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.' 0 8 If the intent
of Congress is clear, the court, as well as the agency, must give
Restore Accountability to the Regulatory Process, by Senator Orrin G. Hatch, YALE J. REG.
http://yalejreg.com/nc/congress-must-act-to-restore-accountability-to-the-regulatory(2016),
process-by-senator-orrin-g-hatch/.
101 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012).
102 Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("To comply with section
2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must be 'procedural'-i.e., it must 'govern the conduct of
proceedings in the Office."'); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 811 (E.D. Va. 2008).
103 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
104 Lamoille Valley R. Co. v. I.C.C., 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
105 "Policy decisions, whereby an agency could, for example, adjust assessments to encourage or
discourage a particular activity, would ... infringe on Congress's exclusive power to levy taxes."
Seafarers Int'l Union v. U.S. Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
106 When an applicant files a reply after the expiration of the shortened statutory period (but
before the expiration of the statutory six month period), the reply will only be accepted if
accompanied by a petition for extension of time and the required fee. MPEP § 710.02(e) ("If an
shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend
applicant is required to reply within a ...
the time period for reply . . . if a petition for an extension of time and the fee are filed . . . .").
Thus, failure to pay the fee will result in abandonment of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 133; MPEP
§ 710.
107 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
108 Id. at 842.
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effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 109 If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation."10
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."'
2) "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."112
3) "[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted
to administer . .. whenever decision as to the meaning or reach
of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a
full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
regulations . . . . 'If this choice represents a reasonable
accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to
the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation3 is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned. "'ll

Thus, Chevron deference requires that courts should defer to
administrative agency interpretations of their organic statutes unless the
interpretations are unreasonable. If the statute unambiguously addresses
the issue, then the statute controls; if the statute is ambiguous, then the
agency's interpretation should be accepted unless it is arbitrary or
capricious.1

14

A slightly different issue is presented when the agency is
109 Id. at 842-43.
110 Id. at 843.
111 Id
112 Id. at 843-44.
113 Id. at 844-45 (emphasis added).
114 Id (Environmental Protection Agency); Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012) (Department
of Labor); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2012) (Board of Immigration Appeals).
Chevron deference creates a separation of powers tension. Agencies are executive branch entities.
Some feel that courts defer to executive agencies, or, for that matter, some feel that Congress
delegating authority to the executive branch is problematic. There have been legislative efforts to
overrule Chevron and Auer, such as the Separation of Powers Restoration Act.
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interpreting, not the statute which it administers, but its own regulations.
This issue is controlled by so-called "Auer deference" which requires
courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
provided the interpretation is not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation."' 5
Thus, the first two issues would be whether the USPTO's system
of shortened statutory periods and late fees is procedural (and therefore
within the USPTO's rulemaking authority) or substantive (and therefore
beyond the USPTO's rulemaking authority), and if it is procedural,
whether it is an interpretation of the statute or of the USPTO's own
regulations.
Deference is especially favored where the agency has special
expertise with respect to the regulation.1 16 Thus, an additional issue
would be whether the USPTO has special expertise in setting deadlines
for processing patent applications (and whether the universal shortened
period is inconsistent with the six months set by Congress) or in setting
the price for missing the shortened statutory period for response.
B. The Notice and Comment Requirement
As part of establishing the extension fee system, the USPTO
should have given public notice of the proposal and underlying
rationale.1 7 In the most recent notice proposing fee changes, there is
extensive discussion of policy and there are conclusory statements to
the effect that the fee increases help "facilitate effective administration
of the patent system by encouraging applicants or patent holders to
engage in certain activities that facilitate an effective patent system."" 8
The regulatory impact analysis supporting the proposed changes is little
more enlightening: "The increase in the extension of time fees
incentivizes an applicant to give more consideration to filing an
extension of time request, and thereby facilitates the prompt conclusion
of application processing, which assists in reducing patent application
pendency. Concluding prosecution more quickly also has wider societal

115 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).

116 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015); Utility Air Regulatory Group v. E.P.A., 134 S.Ct.
2427 (2014).
117 Federal Register notice and an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments are
required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
118 77 Fed. Reg. 55028, 55032 ("The proposed fee structure helps facilitate effective
administration of the patent system by encouraging applicants or patent holders to engage in
certain activities that facilitate an effective patent system. In particular, setting fees at the
particular levels proposed here will: (1) Encourage the submission of applications or other actions
that enable examiners to provide prompt, quality interim and final decisions; (2) encourage the
prompt conclusion of prosecution of an application, which results in pendency reduction, faster
dissemination of information, and certainty in patented inventions; and (3) help recover the
additional costs imposed by some applicants' more intensive use of certain services that strain the
patent system.").
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benefits, because new ideas can go to market faster and provide
technological progress, job creation, and wage growth."1 19
Thus, the record includes no specific discussion of how raising
extension fees furthers those goals, and a rationale may be hard to come
by, given the across the board application regardless of reason for delay
or impact of delay. It is fair to ask why the USPTO has not done so, and
whether it could, albeit belatedly, provide a valid rationale for its
extension fee system.
Congress, of course, has the power to delegate certain types of
decisions and judgments to administrative agencies and it has here
delegated some decision making and judgment to the Commissioner of
Patents. There is statutory authority to set a shortened period for
response. It appears, however, that the Commissioner has simply
adopted a blanket rule that, while Congress thought six months was a
reasonable period to respond to the USPTO, the period of response
should ALWAYS be reduced. In other words, the USPTO has
substituted its judgment for Congress without explanation or
justification.
Moreover, the USPTO has never changed the shortened statutory
period, from the three months it initially set, suggesting that it does not
have (or if it has, it has not exercised) any special expertise in
determining what the appropriate period for response is.
The USPTO has not offered support for the regulation. It is,
therefore, not a question of interpretation of an agency's own
regulations, but rather whether the regulations have been validly
adopted.
In addition, as required by Executive Orders 12,866120 and
13,563,121 agencies are required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis,
weighing the costs and potential impact on patent applicants against
defined and quantified benefits to the agency and the public. The
USPTO's stated rationale is that the extension fee "incentivizes an
applicant to give more consideration to filing an extension of time
request, and thereby facilitates the prompt conclusion of application
processing" 122-far short of "defined and quantified" benefits. As part
of its analysis, the USPTO should also have considered whether there
were alternative, less costly means, for achieving the perceived
benefits. 123
While the extension fee system may be an excellent component of
119 See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 111.
12o Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993).
11 Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 14 (Jan. 21, 2011). For an
analysis of the role of Executive Orders, see Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124
YALE L. J. 2026 (2015).
122 See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 111.
123 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 F.R. § 51735 (1993); OMB Circular A-4.
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a patent system, the USPTO has not met its obligation to explain why
that is so.
VI. OPTIONS
If the current system has not been adopted in conformance with the
APA, three questions follow:
1. Can the USPTO salvage the system by complying with the
APA;
2. Do patent applicants have any recourse for recovering
extension fees paid to the USPTO?
3. Is there a better path for the USPTO to accomplish the
objectives of improving the patent prosecution process?
A. The USPTO's Options
Compliance with the APA is mechanically simple. The agency
merely needs to provide public notice of its proposed action, along with
its justification. 12 4 The public is normally afforded an opportunity to
comment on the proposal, the agency is obliged to consider the public
comments, and the agency must then provide notice of the final form in
which it will adopt the rule and an explanation of the. basis for the
rule.

125

The Supreme Court has "frequently reiterated that an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given
manner." 26 While others might speculate as to the rationale, the
justification must be provided by the agency. Neither the commentators
nor the courts can supply an ex post facto rationale on the agency's
behalf. 127
The problem for the USPTO is whether it can, in fact, provide an
acceptable rationale for its program. It has statutory authority to set a
shortened period for response. The commissioner has, however, simply
adopted a blanket rule that, while Congress thought six months (reduced
from a year) a reasonable period to respond to the USPTO, the period of
response will ALWAYS be set at three months.
124 The agency is required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and
to give interested persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments. 5 U.S.C. §
553(b).
125 Following publication of the Federal Register notice and receipt of public comments, the
agency must then consider the relevant arguments and adopt final rules including "a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose". 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
126 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48

(1983).
127 S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). The court may not accept "appellate
counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).
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The USPTO asserts that this system "incentivizes an applicant to
give more consideration to filing an extension of time request, and
thereby facilitates the prompt conclusion of application processing,
[c]oncluding prosecution more quickly" which
which assists in ...
means that "new ideas can go to market faster and provide technological
progress . . . ."128
Assuming that prompt conclusion of the application process is a
desirable goal then, at a minimum, the USPTO should explain how
"more consideration" facilitates this prompt conclusion. It appears from
the amount of revenue generated by extension fees that a large number
of applicants (having, perhaps, given "more consideration") still need
(or choose to pay for) additional time. 129
A more detailed analysis might fairly raise the question of whether
"prompt conclusion" is the goal in all cases. Consider, for example, the
case of a small startup company with a revolutionary invention but a
small staff and a limited budget. Given the demands on its staff,
responding to a complex office action might require more than three
months. Exceeding the three month shortened statutory period would
then require the company to "give . . . consideration" to filing an
extension petition. If the demands on its budget mean that, after this
consideration, it cannot pay the extension fee, then the USPTO will
have accomplished its goal of "concluding prosecution . . . quickly."
The view from the company's side is quite different, though, which is
that it loses its patent protection. Perhaps that means that the company
never brings the invention to the public. An objective observer might
well conclude that the broader goal of "promoting progress" has not
been met.
The USPTO might then consider adopting a more nuanced
regulation, perhaps giving more time to small entities and even more
time to micro entities or at a minimum allowing a petition to include
arguments as to why no extension fee should be due. 130
B. The Applicants' Options
If the extension of time fee system was not validly adopted, patent
applicants have a range of options for challenging it, and applicants who
have already paid extension fees may have claims in the half billion to
billion dollar range against the USPTO.
Options range from the highly risky refusal to pay the fees (the
USPTO will hold the application abandoned under its current rules and
128

See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 81, at 111.

129 See USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, supra note 1.

130 Examples of justifications for waiver of the fee might include the complexity of the action
taken by the USPTO, the reason for the need for additional time or the nature of the applicant.
Thus, an applicant could choose between explaining the delay or taking the "no-fault" fee option.
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the applicant will be forced to sue), to the less risky suit for mandamus
to order the USPTO to amend or withdraw its regulation, to the
somewhat friendlier petition to amend the regulations.
If the regulation requiring payment of a late fee is invalid, there is
no need to comply with it. Thus, one approach would be to comply with
the six-month statutory time limit and submit the required response
without payment of the fee. Assuming that the USPTO refused to enter
the applicant's response in the record and proceed with evaluating the
patent application, the applicant could sue to compel entry of the
response and further processing of the application.13 1 This approach
would, of course, be risky, time-consuming and not cost-effective. The
risk would be that the USPTO prevailed in court, with the result that the
applicant would in all likelihood lose patent protection. A court
proceeding would certainly take enough time that the application would
exceed the six-month statutory period, resulting in abandonment. 132
Because the term of a patent begins when the patent is issued and
expires twenty years from the date the application was filed, 133 the time
taken in litigation would reduce the term of patent protection. Finally,
the cost of litigation would surely exceed the cost of even the most
expensive petition for extension of time.
A safer course would be to file a petition asking the USPTO to
withdraw the extension of time regulations. Under the APA, agencies
are required to permit petitions for repeal or amendments of agency
rules. 134 A parallel petition might be filed with the Congressional
Budget Office, asking it to exercise its supervisory authority over
federal administrative agency regulations.
If the USPTO declined to withdraw the late fee regulations, an
applicant could ask the federal courts to order the USPTO to do so.
While the cost would be significantly greater than the cost of filing the
petition and paying the late fee, at least the risk of loss of patent rights
would be eliminated.
Finally, the regulations could be challenged by paying the fees,
then filing a suit to recover previously paid fees. A class action might
claim on the order of a half billion dollars.

131 See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1962).
132 A procedure for reviving abandoned applications under some circumstances exists. It involves
filing a petition and paying a fee (which currently ranges from $850 to $1,700 depending on the
nature of the applicant). See 37 C.F R. § 1.17(m) (2015).
133 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2013).
134 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1966).

